The Consent Solution to Punishment and the Explicit Denial Objection
Recently, David Boonin has put forward several objections to Carlos S. Nino's 'Consensual Theory of Punishment'. In this paper I will defend Nino against the 'explicit denial objection'. I will discuss whether Boonin's interpretation of Nino as a tacit consent theorist is right. I will argue that the offender's consent is neither tacit nor express, but a special category of implicit consent. Further, for Nino the legal-normative consequences of an act (of crime) are 'irrevocable', i.e. one cannot (expressly and successfully) deny liability to them. I will suggest an explanation for Nino's irrevocability claim.
THEORIA :: eISSN: 2171-679X | ISSN: 0495-4548
THEORIA is published under a Creative Commons Licence:
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Generic